OLD Results and Studies
Is TikTok a Gateway to Politics in the Baltics? For Now, Only in Latvia
February 2023
Authors: Inga Spriņģe (Re:Baltica), Aistė Meidutė (Delfi.lt) and Kaili Malts (Delfi.ee)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
Although there is a common assumption that TikTok is used only by a younger generation, Re:Baltica’s analysis shows that in Latvia it’s a powerful tool enough for populists to get into parliament.
After shutting down Kremlin’s TV channels, TikTok has become fertile soil also for Kremlin’s narratives. Latvian State Security service has started seven criminal investigations for supporting Moscow on TikTok, while Lithuania and Estonia are taking a lighter approach.
Why so, read in Re:Baltica’s Baltic disinformation quarterly review about the use of TikTok.
Read the report here: 2023_FEBRUARY_Is TikTok a Gateway to Politics in the Baltics_ For Now, Only in Latvia-30012024
Step by step: what arguments is Russia using this year to mislead the Baltics?
March 2023
Mārcis Balodis (Delfi LV)
Part of D2.4 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471,
coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th last year has altered its longstanding efforts to influence the information landscape of Latvia and the Baltic States through disinformation campaigns. This report highlights the central themes in these campaigns, ranging from accusations of widespread Russophobia to portrayals of Western countries as intellectual concentration camps. These narratives serve the Kremlin’s objectives of influencing public opinion and advancing its regional interests.
Read the report: 2023_MARCH_STEP-BY-STEP_-WHAT-ARGUMENTS-IS-RUSSIA-USING-THIS-YEAR-TO-MISLEAD-THE-BALTICS
Kremlin’s propaganda in our pockets. How disinformation thrives on Telegram.
July 2023
Anastasija Tetarenko-Supe (Re:Baltica)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
By banning Kremlin’s TV and online propaganda in the Baltics, the access to such resources has become more challenging only for those whose primary source used to be television. Now social media platforms have taken up that space, among which Telegram stands out because it does not share data with governments and does not moderate disinformation and lies.
In the Baltics, the most popular channels directed towards local Russian speakers are not having the big following in numbers, but that is not the point: their main role is to amplify each other’s content and create the impression that many people think alike. Telegram played a particularly significant role during the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Various activists, both well-known and new, have joined forces on “Telegram” to popularise pro-Kremlin messages.
Read the report: 2023_JULY_KREMLINS-PROPAGANDA-IN-OUR-POCKETS.-HOW-DISINFORMATION-THRIVES-ON-TELEGRAM 30012024
Disinformation trends in the Baltics: war in Ukraine, NATO presence and controversy over edible insects
July 2023
Madara Eihe (Re:Baltica)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
During the second quarter of the year the fact-checking efforts in the three Baltic states primarily concentrated on the war in Ukraine and the spread of Russian propaganda about it. The highest level of Ukraine-related disinformation was found in Lithuania, while Latvia and Estonia saw a decline.
Non-war related conspiracies and fabricated stories about the health featured heavily in the all three Baltic states. For example, false claims emerged in Latvia and Lithuania that massive earthquakes in Syria and Turkey were deliberately induced by a US-controlled “climate weapon,” aiming to tarnish the reputation of US officials, local authorities, the United Nations, NATO and EU.
Read the report: 2023_JULY_Disinformation-trends-in-Baltics 30012024
Original: https://en.rebaltica.lv/author/madara-eihe-specially-for-rebaltica/
Step By Step: How Russian Propaganda ‘Explains’ Events in Latvia
July 2023
Mārcis Balodis (Delfi LV)
Part of D2.4 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471,
coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
Despite over a year passing since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has yet to achieve its objectives. Ukraine remains resolute, Western nations persist in their efforts to contain Russia and support Ukraine, and NATO has expanded its influence. In this context, pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns aimed at Baltic States, including Latvia, disseminate a variety of messages. Their aim is to influence local audiences and disrupt the current status quo. Notably, pro-Kremlin disinformation maintains a consistent and unchanging message, with both form and content remaining largely unchanged from previous iterations.
Read the report here: 2023_JULY_STEP-BY-STEP-HOW-RUSSIAN-PROPAGANDA-EXPLAINS-EVENTS-IN-LATVIA
Original: https://www.delfi.lv/atmaskots/punktu-pa-punktam-ka-krievijas-propaganda-skaidro-latvija-notiekoso.d?id=55736536
Pants on fire: how climate misinformation is spread in the Baltic states?
October 2023
Ronalds Siliņš (Re:Baltica)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
Whether their goal is to amass a following, oppose environmentally friendly policies, or resist what they perceive as “totalitarian global control”, a diverse group of disinformation spreaders has shifted its focus to the topic of climate change. This report provides an overview of how climate misinformation is disseminated in the Baltic States, shedding light on the tactics and actors involved in spreading false or misleading information on the topic of climate change.
Read the report: BECID_OCTOBER-2023_PANTS-ON-FIRE 30012024
The Latest Stories from Troll Farms: NATO Serving Latvia and the Benefits of Authoritarianism
November 2023
Mārcis Balodis (Delfi LV)
Part of D2.4 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471,
coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
This report delves into the disinformation tactics employed by Russia and Belarus amidst geopolitical tensions. It critically examines the shaping of narratives around security, NATO’s role, and life in authoritarian states. It highlights how these manipulated stories influence public opinion and policy in the Baltic States and Poland, underscoring the potency and adaptability of modern disinformation in international relations.
Read the report: 2023_NOVEMBER_The-latest-stories-from-troll-farms-NATO-serving-Latvia-and-the-benefits-of-authoritarianism
BECID Year 1 Report
December 2022-December 2023
Maia Klaassen | Coordinator and Junior Research Fellow
Inger Klesment | Communication and Media Literacy Specialist
Gretel Juhansoo | Communication and Media Literacy Specialist
… in co-creation with the whole hub and its stakeholders.
First part of the deliverable 1.4 for the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
The BECID 2023 report is a comprehensive overview of the initiatives and achievements of the Baltic Engagement Centre for Combating Information Disorders. It covers diverse areas such as project management, fact-checking activities across the Baltic states, research and analysis, media literacy initiatives, and student research highlights. Some key aspects include innovative approaches to digital media literacy, establishing educational programs and workshops, and collaborative efforts with various national authorities and organizations. The report provides valuable insights into the fight against information disorders in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, highlighting significant progress and future strategies.
Who Is Spreading LGBT+ Disinformation in the Baltics?
January 2024
Ronalds Siliņš (Re:Baltica), Evita Puriņa (Re:Baltica)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
In May 2023, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) which collects the trends all over the EU, reported that LGBT+ issues are one of the most popular and persistent topics of disinformation. Most narratives about the traditional family, which supposedly is under attack, are also relevant in the Baltics.
In Latvia, this time it resurfaced due to two legislative initiatives. Latvia was one of the last EU countries to adopt any sort of framework for civil partnership. Also, after many years of discussions it ratified the Istanbul Convention which aims to prevent violence against women.
Read more from the report: BECID_January_2024_Who_is_spreading_LGBT_disinformation_in_the_Baltics 30012024
Original: https://en.rebaltica.lv/2024/01/who-is-spreading-lgbt-disinformation-in-the-baltics/
Mitigating (Dis)information Vulnerability With Situational Risk Awareness And HumanCentered Approaches: A Conceptual Model
2023
Auksė Balčytienė | Senior Researcher, VMU
Dmytro Iarovyi | Junior Researcher, VMU
…with help and input from others in BECID’s research team, led by BECID’s Principal Investigator, Professor Andra Siibak, UTARTU
Part of D3.1 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
This analysis delves into the concept of (dis)information vulnerability, outlining the determining factors according to which individuals and groups are susceptible to the detrimental consequences of the supremacy of online manipulations.
Defining the concept of “(dis)information vulnerability” is a challenging matter because of its multi-dimensionality and particularity, which depend on individual characteristics and contextual conditions. Hence, this paper integrates human-centred aspects of information processing by incorporating individual (socio-demographic characteristics, such as age and education) along with socio-psychological capacities like self-efficacy assessments and values, which become particularly crucial in decision-making situations that are prone to conflicts and disagreements. Additionally, the approach incorporates socio-structural and situational features prevalent in contemporary media and communications.
The starting point here, specifically, is based on the notion that information manipulations are significantly influenced by digital technology and information accessibility, but, most importantly, also by national contextual specificities, namely the socio-cultural values and traditions in information provision and use. Among those are the defining characteristics of agenda setting and representations within the media, but, most importantly, individual factors, such as individual accessibility to media and digital skills, as well as socio-psychological aspects, including various (cognitive) biases, media awareness and related factors of moral reasoning in decisions making and information processing.
In this context, universalist policy-making requires heightened sensitivity and awareness of the risks associated with the spread of manipulative content and individual actor responses to dysfunctional communication situations. It is important to consider that although (dis)information vulnerability has become a part of the media policy debate, it nevertheless remains a domain of expert knowledge. Solutions are generated by taking a perspective “from above”, such as proposing media literacy programs or advancing fact-checking by media organisations. Despite these efforts, there is insufficient knowledge and a lack of evidence-based understanding about the scope of effects of detrimental content on people’s reasoning, thereby influencing societal integrity. Thus, the emphasis lies in assessing conceptual definitions and research findings that illuminate the risks of (dis)information vulnerability. In the end, a conceptual model is proposed, which integrates all these critical aspects.
Read the analysis here: D3.1 (2) Mitigating Disinformation Vulnerability
Teaching Media Literacy At School As An Interdisciplinary Objective
2024
Andres Kõnno | Senior Researcher, TLU
Külli-Riin Tigasson | Senior Researcher, TLU
…with help and input from others in BECID’s research team, led by BECID’s Principal Investigator, Professor Andra Siibak, UTARTU
Part of D3.1 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
In the Estonian context, the debate on misinformation’s destructive impact on society started in 2006 and 2007 in connection with the public debate on removing the World War II monument (also known as the “Bronze Soldier Campaign”) from Tallinn. The cyber-attacks on Estonia’s critical infrastructure that followed the monument’s removal were unprecedented locally and globally (Tamm, 2012). The following 15 years will be momentous regarding the spread of global disinformation. Significant events included Russia’s invasion of Georgia (in 2008) and Ukraine (2014), Brexit (2016), as well as Donald Trump’s election campaign (2016). In 2019/2020, we witnessed the spread of misinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by the war in Ukraine in February 2022. On the one hand, these events created a need to increase societal resilience to misinformation, inevitably accompanied by a debate on the effectiveness of different measures to help maintain social order.
From a societal point of view, educational policy measures to counter misinformation are long-term and do not have an immediate impact. The debate on these measures occurs both inside and outside the educational field. In the definition of the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, the teaching of media literacy at school is, above all, a broad-based task:
The need to teach media literacy at school in an interdisciplinary way has been discussed in Estonia since at least the 2011 revision of the national curriculum for primary schools (Official Journal, 2011). Various reports on this topic have been published since then, and there is an ongoing corresponding committee at the Ministry of Education and Research (see Ministry of Education and Research 2023b, 2023c). In this part of the report, we focus on how the ‘interdisciplinary’ approach to media literacy in science literature has been reflected in the last decade (2013-2023), focusing on its teaching in general education schools. Above all, we are interested in what concepts are used to define interdisciplinary media literacy and to what extent there is overlap. This works as a complimentary supplement to the work done by national authorities but should also be of interest to current and future educators.
Read the report: D3.1 (4) Teaching Media Literacy At School As An Interdisciplinary Objective
Conceptual and methodological approaches in societal resilience research
2024
Kristina Juraitė, Dmytro Iarovyi, Sten Torpan, Ragne Kõuts-Klemm
…with help and input from others in BECID’s research team, led by BECID’s Principal Investigator, Professor Andra Siibak, UTARTU
Part of D3.1 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
This systematic literature review aimed to investigate public responses and capacities in coping with the increasing challenges and risks associated with disinformation and other media-related disorders. It is based on more than 150 articles published since 2010. The primary objective of this review was to understand how resilience to disinformation and other information disorders is conceptualized and operationalized in academic literature.
One central aspect of the study focuses on the conceptualization of resilience. The studies define societal resilience against disinformation mainly as the social capacities, competences, and resources available to individuals and different groups in society to recognize and counteract the harmful effects of disinformation.
Resilience to disinformation is defined as a state in which disinformation fails to reach a significant portion of citizens or, at the very least, is unsuccessful in persuading those who encounter it to disseminate it.
Research indicates that societal resilience and the capacity to cope with disinformation are specific to each country and highly dependent on the socio-political and information environment. These studies shed light on various factors, including structural conditions (networks, institutions, and discourses) on one hand, and social actors’ (individual capacities and agency) approach on the other. They also highlight sociocultural factors (values, knowledge, trust, and practices) and contextual factors (social, political, and economic conditions, institutional settings, and power relations).
The study explores vulnerabilities stemming from disinformation, spanning various domains such as democracy, security, public health, economics, and technology. Furthermore, the report delves into conditioning factors that impact vulnerability or resilience to disinformation. These factors include characteristics of information, the environment, and information recipients.
Read the report: D3.1_Conceptual_and_Methodological_Approaches_in_Societal_Resilience_Research
OLD Results and Studies
Is TikTok a Gateway to Politics in the Baltics? For Now, Only in Latvia
February 2023
Authors: Inga Spriņģe (Re:Baltica), Aistė Meidutė (Delfi.lt) and Kaili Malts (Delfi.ee)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
Although there is a common assumption that TikTok is used only by a younger generation, Re:Baltica’s analysis shows that in Latvia it’s a powerful tool enough for populists to get into parliament.
After shutting down Kremlin’s TV channels, TikTok has become fertile soil also for Kremlin’s narratives. Latvian State Security service has started seven criminal investigations for supporting Moscow on TikTok, while Lithuania and Estonia are taking a lighter approach.
Why so, read in Re:Baltica’s Baltic disinformation quarterly review about the use of TikTok.
Read the report here: 2023_FEBRUARY_Is TikTok a Gateway to Politics in the Baltics_ For Now, Only in Latvia-30012024
Step by step: what arguments is Russia using this year to mislead the Baltics?
March 2023
Mārcis Balodis (Delfi LV)
Part of D2.4 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471,
coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th last year has altered its longstanding efforts to influence the information landscape of Latvia and the Baltic States through disinformation campaigns. This report highlights the central themes in these campaigns, ranging from accusations of widespread Russophobia to portrayals of Western countries as intellectual concentration camps. These narratives serve the Kremlin’s objectives of influencing public opinion and advancing its regional interests.
Read the report: 2023_MARCH_STEP-BY-STEP_-WHAT-ARGUMENTS-IS-RUSSIA-USING-THIS-YEAR-TO-MISLEAD-THE-BALTICS
Kremlin’s propaganda in our pockets. How disinformation thrives on Telegram.
July 2023
Anastasija Tetarenko-Supe (Re:Baltica)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
By banning Kremlin’s TV and online propaganda in the Baltics, the access to such resources has become more challenging only for those whose primary source used to be television. Now social media platforms have taken up that space, among which Telegram stands out because it does not share data with governments and does not moderate disinformation and lies.
In the Baltics, the most popular channels directed towards local Russian speakers are not having the big following in numbers, but that is not the point: their main role is to amplify each other’s content and create the impression that many people think alike. Telegram played a particularly significant role during the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Various activists, both well-known and new, have joined forces on “Telegram” to popularise pro-Kremlin messages.
Read the report: 2023_JULY_KREMLINS-PROPAGANDA-IN-OUR-POCKETS.-HOW-DISINFORMATION-THRIVES-ON-TELEGRAM 30012024
Disinformation trends in the Baltics: war in Ukraine, NATO presence and controversy over edible insects
July 2023
Madara Eihe (Re:Baltica)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
During the second quarter of the year the fact-checking efforts in the three Baltic states primarily concentrated on the war in Ukraine and the spread of Russian propaganda about it. The highest level of Ukraine-related disinformation was found in Lithuania, while Latvia and Estonia saw a decline.
Non-war related conspiracies and fabricated stories about the health featured heavily in the all three Baltic states. For example, false claims emerged in Latvia and Lithuania that massive earthquakes in Syria and Turkey were deliberately induced by a US-controlled “climate weapon,” aiming to tarnish the reputation of US officials, local authorities, the United Nations, NATO and EU.
Read the report: 2023_JULY_Disinformation-trends-in-Baltics 30012024
Original: https://en.rebaltica.lv/author/madara-eihe-specially-for-rebaltica/
Step By Step: How Russian Propaganda ‘Explains’ Events in Latvia
July 2023
Mārcis Balodis (Delfi LV)
Part of D2.4 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471,
coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
Despite over a year passing since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has yet to achieve its objectives. Ukraine remains resolute, Western nations persist in their efforts to contain Russia and support Ukraine, and NATO has expanded its influence. In this context, pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns aimed at Baltic States, including Latvia, disseminate a variety of messages. Their aim is to influence local audiences and disrupt the current status quo. Notably, pro-Kremlin disinformation maintains a consistent and unchanging message, with both form and content remaining largely unchanged from previous iterations.
Read the report here: 2023_JULY_STEP-BY-STEP-HOW-RUSSIAN-PROPAGANDA-EXPLAINS-EVENTS-IN-LATVIA
Original: https://www.delfi.lv/atmaskots/punktu-pa-punktam-ka-krievijas-propaganda-skaidro-latvija-notiekoso.d?id=55736536
Pants on fire: how climate misinformation is spread in the Baltic states?
October 2023
Ronalds Siliņš (Re:Baltica)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
Whether their goal is to amass a following, oppose environmentally friendly policies, or resist what they perceive as “totalitarian global control”, a diverse group of disinformation spreaders has shifted its focus to the topic of climate change. This report provides an overview of how climate misinformation is disseminated in the Baltic States, shedding light on the tactics and actors involved in spreading false or misleading information on the topic of climate change.
Read the report: BECID_OCTOBER-2023_PANTS-ON-FIRE 30012024
The Latest Stories from Troll Farms: NATO Serving Latvia and the Benefits of Authoritarianism
November 2023
Mārcis Balodis (Delfi LV)
Part of D2.4 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471,
coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
This report delves into the disinformation tactics employed by Russia and Belarus amidst geopolitical tensions. It critically examines the shaping of narratives around security, NATO’s role, and life in authoritarian states. It highlights how these manipulated stories influence public opinion and policy in the Baltic States and Poland, underscoring the potency and adaptability of modern disinformation in international relations.
Read the report: 2023_NOVEMBER_The-latest-stories-from-troll-farms-NATO-serving-Latvia-and-the-benefits-of-authoritarianism
BECID Year 1 Report
December 2022-December 2023
Maia Klaassen | Coordinator and Junior Research Fellow
Inger Klesment | Communication and Media Literacy Specialist
Gretel Juhansoo | Communication and Media Literacy Specialist
… in co-creation with the whole hub and its stakeholders.
First part of the deliverable 1.4 for the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
The BECID 2023 report is a comprehensive overview of the initiatives and achievements of the Baltic Engagement Centre for Combating Information Disorders. It covers diverse areas such as project management, fact-checking activities across the Baltic states, research and analysis, media literacy initiatives, and student research highlights. Some key aspects include innovative approaches to digital media literacy, establishing educational programs and workshops, and collaborative efforts with various national authorities and organizations. The report provides valuable insights into the fight against information disorders in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, highlighting significant progress and future strategies.
Who Is Spreading LGBT+ Disinformation in the Baltics?
January 2024
Ronalds Siliņš (Re:Baltica), Evita Puriņa (Re:Baltica)
Part of D2.5 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
In May 2023, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) which collects the trends all over the EU, reported that LGBT+ issues are one of the most popular and persistent topics of disinformation. Most narratives about the traditional family, which supposedly is under attack, are also relevant in the Baltics.
In Latvia, this time it resurfaced due to two legislative initiatives. Latvia was one of the last EU countries to adopt any sort of framework for civil partnership. Also, after many years of discussions it ratified the Istanbul Convention which aims to prevent violence against women.
Read more from the report: BECID_January_2024_Who_is_spreading_LGBT_disinformation_in_the_Baltics 30012024
Original: https://en.rebaltica.lv/2024/01/who-is-spreading-lgbt-disinformation-in-the-baltics/
Mitigating (Dis)information Vulnerability With Situational Risk Awareness And HumanCentered Approaches: A Conceptual Model
2023
Auksė Balčytienė | Senior Researcher, VMU
Dmytro Iarovyi | Junior Researcher, VMU
…with help and input from others in BECID’s research team, led by BECID’s Principal Investigator, Professor Andra Siibak, UTARTU
Part of D3.1 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
This analysis delves into the concept of (dis)information vulnerability, outlining the determining factors according to which individuals and groups are susceptible to the detrimental consequences of the supremacy of online manipulations.
Defining the concept of “(dis)information vulnerability” is a challenging matter because of its multi-dimensionality and particularity, which depend on individual characteristics and contextual conditions. Hence, this paper integrates human-centred aspects of information processing by incorporating individual (socio-demographic characteristics, such as age and education) along with socio-psychological capacities like self-efficacy assessments and values, which become particularly crucial in decision-making situations that are prone to conflicts and disagreements. Additionally, the approach incorporates socio-structural and situational features prevalent in contemporary media and communications.
The starting point here, specifically, is based on the notion that information manipulations are significantly influenced by digital technology and information accessibility, but, most importantly, also by national contextual specificities, namely the socio-cultural values and traditions in information provision and use. Among those are the defining characteristics of agenda setting and representations within the media, but, most importantly, individual factors, such as individual accessibility to media and digital skills, as well as socio-psychological aspects, including various (cognitive) biases, media awareness and related factors of moral reasoning in decisions making and information processing.
In this context, universalist policy-making requires heightened sensitivity and awareness of the risks associated with the spread of manipulative content and individual actor responses to dysfunctional communication situations. It is important to consider that although (dis)information vulnerability has become a part of the media policy debate, it nevertheless remains a domain of expert knowledge. Solutions are generated by taking a perspective “from above”, such as proposing media literacy programs or advancing fact-checking by media organisations. Despite these efforts, there is insufficient knowledge and a lack of evidence-based understanding about the scope of effects of detrimental content on people’s reasoning, thereby influencing societal integrity. Thus, the emphasis lies in assessing conceptual definitions and research findings that illuminate the risks of (dis)information vulnerability. In the end, a conceptual model is proposed, which integrates all these critical aspects.
Read the analysis here: D3.1 (2) Mitigating Disinformation Vulnerability
Teaching Media Literacy At School As An Interdisciplinary Objective
2024
Andres Kõnno | Senior Researcher, TLU
Külli-Riin Tigasson | Senior Researcher, TLU
…with help and input from others in BECID’s research team, led by BECID’s Principal Investigator, Professor Andra Siibak, UTARTU
Part of D3.1 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
In the Estonian context, the debate on misinformation’s destructive impact on society started in 2006 and 2007 in connection with the public debate on removing the World War II monument (also known as the “Bronze Soldier Campaign”) from Tallinn. The cyber-attacks on Estonia’s critical infrastructure that followed the monument’s removal were unprecedented locally and globally (Tamm, 2012). The following 15 years will be momentous regarding the spread of global disinformation. Significant events included Russia’s invasion of Georgia (in 2008) and Ukraine (2014), Brexit (2016), as well as Donald Trump’s election campaign (2016). In 2019/2020, we witnessed the spread of misinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by the war in Ukraine in February 2022. On the one hand, these events created a need to increase societal resilience to misinformation, inevitably accompanied by a debate on the effectiveness of different measures to help maintain social order.
From a societal point of view, educational policy measures to counter misinformation are long-term and do not have an immediate impact. The debate on these measures occurs both inside and outside the educational field. In the definition of the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, the teaching of media literacy at school is, above all, a broad-based task:
The need to teach media literacy at school in an interdisciplinary way has been discussed in Estonia since at least the 2011 revision of the national curriculum for primary schools (Official Journal, 2011). Various reports on this topic have been published since then, and there is an ongoing corresponding committee at the Ministry of Education and Research (see Ministry of Education and Research 2023b, 2023c). In this part of the report, we focus on how the ‘interdisciplinary’ approach to media literacy in science literature has been reflected in the last decade (2013-2023), focusing on its teaching in general education schools. Above all, we are interested in what concepts are used to define interdisciplinary media literacy and to what extent there is overlap. This works as a complimentary supplement to the work done by national authorities but should also be of interest to current and future educators.
Read the report: D3.1 (4) Teaching Media Literacy At School As An Interdisciplinary Objective
Conceptual and methodological approaches in societal resilience research
2024
Kristina Juraitė, Dmytro Iarovyi, Sten Torpan, Ragne Kõuts-Klemm
…with help and input from others in BECID’s research team, led by BECID’s Principal Investigator, Professor Andra Siibak, UTARTU
Part of D3.1 of the EU-funded project with the ID 118471, coordinated by the University of Tartu (UTARTU).
This systematic literature review aimed to investigate public responses and capacities in coping with the increasing challenges and risks associated with disinformation and other media-related disorders. It is based on more than 150 articles published since 2010. The primary objective of this review was to understand how resilience to disinformation and other information disorders is conceptualized and operationalized in academic literature.
One central aspect of the study focuses on the conceptualization of resilience. The studies define societal resilience against disinformation mainly as the social capacities, competences, and resources available to individuals and different groups in society to recognize and counteract the harmful effects of disinformation.
Resilience to disinformation is defined as a state in which disinformation fails to reach a significant portion of citizens or, at the very least, is unsuccessful in persuading those who encounter it to disseminate it.
Research indicates that societal resilience and the capacity to cope with disinformation are specific to each country and highly dependent on the socio-political and information environment. These studies shed light on various factors, including structural conditions (networks, institutions, and discourses) on one hand, and social actors’ (individual capacities and agency) approach on the other. They also highlight sociocultural factors (values, knowledge, trust, and practices) and contextual factors (social, political, and economic conditions, institutional settings, and power relations).
The study explores vulnerabilities stemming from disinformation, spanning various domains such as democracy, security, public health, economics, and technology. Furthermore, the report delves into conditioning factors that impact vulnerability or resilience to disinformation. These factors include characteristics of information, the environment, and information recipients.
Read the report: D3.1_Conceptual_and_Methodological_Approaches_in_Societal_Resilience_Research
