Results and Studies
Disinformation trends in the Baltics: war in Ukraine, NATO presence and controversy over edible insects
During the second quarter of the year the fact-checking efforts in the three Baltic states primarily concentrated on the war in Ukraine and the spread of Russian propaganda about it. The highest level of Ukraine-related disinformation was found in Lithuania, while Latvia and Estonia saw a decline.
Non-war related conspiracies and fabricated stories about the health featured heavily in the all three Baltic states. For example, false claims emerged in Latvia and Lithuania that massive earthquakes in Syria and Turkey were deliberately induced by a US-controlled “climate weapon,” aiming to tarnish the reputation of US officials, local authorities, the United Nations, NATO and EU.
Kremlin’s propaganda in our pockets. How disinformation thrives on Telegram.
By banning Kremlin’s TV and online propaganda in the Baltics, the access to such resources has become more challenging only for those whose primary source used to be television. Now social media platforms have taken up that space, among which Telegram stands out because it does not share data with governments and does not moderate disinformation and lies.
In the Baltics, the most popular channels directed towards local Russian speakers are not having the big following in numbers, but that is not the point: their main role is to amplify each other’s content and create the impression that many people think alike. Telegram played a particularly significant role during the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Various activists, both well-known and new, have joined forces on “Telegram” to popularise pro-Kremlin messages.
A Trend Report on Russia’s Disinformation Tactics Targeting the Baltics
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February last year has brought about a change in Russia’s long-standing efforts to influence Latvian and Baltic information spaces with disinformation.
The escalation of the war and the resulting widespread backlash against the Russian regime has reinforced the Kremlin’s need to break the current relationship in order to return to the relative normality that existed before 24 February.
At the same time, it would be wrong to claim that Russian disinformation has been fundamentally transformed in terms of messages against the background of the war, since Russia’s own foreign policy orientations have not been transformed.
But the war has provided new pretexts to try to deliver messages that have been tried and tested for years to audiences, in an attempt to adapt them to the current situation.
Is TikTok a Gateway to Politics in the Baltics? For Now, Only in Latvia
Although there is a common assumption that TikTok is used only by a younger generation, Re:Baltica’s analysis shows that in Latvia it’s a powerful tool enough for populists to get into parliament.
After shutting down Kremlin’s TV channels, TikTok has become fertile soil also for Kremlin’s narratives. Latvian State Security service has started seven criminal investigations for supporting Moscow on TikTok, while Lithuania and Estonia are taking a lighter approach.
Why so, read in Re:Baltica’s Baltic disinformation quarterly review about the use of TikTok.
Report on current issues, methodologies and needs in anti-disinformation actions
DIGIRES report provides an up-to-date analysis of actions to combat disinformation aimed at promoting the digital resilience of Lithuanian society, and proposes the idea of multisectoral integration and multistakeholder partnership.
Report by: Baltic Research Foundation for Digital Resilience
Aukse Balcytiene, Darius Amilevicius, Kristina Berksun, Dmytro larovyi, leva lvanauskaite, Kristina
Juraite, Neringa Jurciukonyte, lgnas Kalpokas, Violeta KaraliOnaite, Rimgaile Kasparaite, Dominyka
Lapelyte, Epp Lauk, Patricija Lenciauskiene, Aiste Meidute, Hannu Nieminen, Ramune Ramanauskiene,
Darius Remeika, JO rate Ruzaite, Brigita Sabaliauskaite, Aiste TurcinaviciOte, Andrius Utka.
Whether their goal is to amass a following, oppose environmentally friendly policies, or resist what they perceive as “totalitarian global control”, a diverse group of disinformation spreaders has shifted its focus to the topic of climate change. This report provides an overview of how climate misinformation is disseminated in the Baltic States, shedding light on the tactics and actors involved in spreading false or misleading information on the topic of climate change.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th last year has altered its longstanding efforts to influence the information landscape of Latvia and the Baltic States through disinformation campaigns. This report highlights the central themes in these campaigns, ranging from accusations of widespread Russophobia to portrayals of Western countries as intellectual concentration camps. These narratives serve the Kremlin’s objectives of influencing public opinion and advancing its interests in the region.
In the wake of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have intensified their efforts to influence narratives in the Baltic States, particularly Latvia. These campaigns exploit a variety of themes to cast Russia as the victim and portray Latvia’s actions as hostile. A recurring theme is Latvia’s alleged subservience to Western countries and their policies, as well as its perceived role in fueling Russophobia and nationalism. This report delves into these narratives, highlighting their core elements and objectives while providing a comprehensive overview of the disinformation tactics employed.
Auksė Balčytienė, Dmytro Iarovyi
Introduction
Disinformation vulnerability is defined as the extent to which individuals, groups of people and communities are susceptible to the implications of digital disinformation. Addressing manipulative situations is significantly influenced by contextual and technological aspects of information provision. These also include the defining characteristics of representations within the media, as well as individual psychological factors, such as cognitive biases and digital skills as well as news consumption habits.
Contested concepts: Resilience and vulnerability
Despite the numerous scholarly attempts to clarify the fuzziness of the concept of disinformation, also the variety of responses to combat it – ranging from structural and legal protection systems on a governmetal level to fact-checking and media literacy efforts by various organizations – there are still quite a few unanswerred questions. The most important ones pertain to the necessary shift from responsive and reactionary to more active risk awareness raising via strategic policymaking moves as well as practical educational interventions. As expected, these moves would foster the democratic epistemic capacities of the public and enhance the resilience to digital information disruptions. In addition to these practices, another issue of hightened significance emerges in the context of complexity in contemporray communications, namelly the strategic everyday efforts required to rebuilding of trust, both in institutions and among fellow citizens.
Responding to such needs, media literacy, fact-checking and platform governance initiatives are advocated by European institutions and collaborative initiatives, such as European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), as well as national and regional Hubs, as the necessary means to the developement of epistemic resilience and sustainable risk awareness among all stakeholders. These efforts hold significant importance in terms of mobilization and sharing of the expertise in governance actions, fact-checking, research innovations and media education on transnational, regional and local levels.
To begin with, online disinformation calls to be defined as a “wicked problem”. Wicked problems refer to a myriad of socio-cultural contexts; they are characterized by high complexity and lack clear definitions. Online disinformation is recognized by its deceptive nature that is inherently marked by significant ambiguity.
Drafting policies to address wicked problems requires a holistic understanding of the entire context, which in the case of online disinformation, is determined by the specificities of the national information ecosystem on one hand and a wide range of stakeholders seeking different solutions on the other. Similarly, examination of disinformation invites a great variety of approaches for analysis, including those encompassing digital technological and socio-political outcomes. So, addressing online disinformation as a wicked problem cannot yield a single definitive approach leading to successful solution.
When dealing with disinformation, in most cases, the focus is on fostering societal resilience as a desirable outcome, around which all solutions aimed at the mitigating of disinformation should revolve. On the other hand, societal resilience itself is an ambiguous social state that lacks a clear-cut definition. Hence, an understanding evolves that all societal reactions to online disinformation, along with susceptibility to manipulations and related vulnerabilities, should be seen and addressed as “symptoms” of some deeper societal conflicts, inequalities, unresolved issues, and responses to change and transformations (Bennett & Livingston, 2020; Kreiss, 2021). Upon further examination it becomes evident that these issues and social narratives are intricately intertwined with the cultural and contextual aspects unique to each country. Their formation is influenced by enduring and unresolved societal conflicts revolving around developmental histories, upheavals, losses, and cultural traditions specific to each geographic and socio-psychological context. As scholars (Juurvee & Arold, 2021; Kapantai et al., 2021; Lewandowsky & Van Der Linden, 2021) argue that the spread of hatred, uncertainty, fear, hate (including hate crimes against minorities, such as immigrants), and vandalism, or supremacism, Islamophobia, racism, or misogyny (Vériter et al., 2020) are largely associated with disinformation spread. Being reinforced through the effect of echo-chambers, the already established radical beliefs are becoming even more dangerous (Bjola & Papadakis, 2021; Di Mascio et al., 2021).
The analysis of disinformation vulnerability comprises a wide range of adverse effects of disinformation on democratic institutions, national security, public health, economic stability, technological issues, and more. The threats to democracy are discussed as the risks of election manipulation by internal and external malignant actors (Kapantai et al., 2021; Lee, 2018; Shackelford et al., 2020; Vériter et al., 2020), the rise of populist movements whose claims are reinforced in such an environment (Di Mascio et al., 2021; Tripodi et al., 2023), the utilization of COVID-related disinformation to enforce attacks on the democratic institutions of the EU or the US (Jerónimo & Esparza, 2022).
One of the frequently observed detrimental effects of disinformation is the attacks against the legitimacy of social and political institutions, leading to a trust crisis and willingness of people to believe in facts (Claudia, 2022; Di Mascio et al., 2021; Lewandowsky & Van Der Linden, 2021; Rodríguez-Pérez & Canel, 2023). In line with assaults on democratic institutions is the national security challenge posed by disinformation. The implications on security are closely related to the challenges in democracy, partly due to the fact that polarization (and radicalization as its consequence) poses security challenges. This cybersecurity component is closely related to effects on democracy aspects mentioned earlier, as the spread of disinformation utilizing technical means further exacerbates the challenges for democracy, for example, through opinion shaping in elections which amplifies polarization (Manwaring & Holloway, 2023).
Furthermore, democracies are specifically vulnerable to such attacks due to narrower opportunities to legitimately deal with disinformation (Shadmy, 2022). As shown in a comprehensive overview done by Bjola & Papadakis (2021) on the case of Finland, disinformation harms the epistemological basis for truth-claim validation, which causes intensification of emotional discussions, empowers destructive counterpublics, and reinforces the challenges towards multiculturalism and diversity.
With this perspective in mind, we contend that national country responses to the influx of disinformation should be examined not only through structural measures such also as policy initiatives and governance decisions made. Instead, developing strategies to combatting disinformation should be treated as socio-political and socio-cultural process that involves multiple stakeholders and requires their awareness and engagement.
For all those efforts to be successful and reach the aim of building a resilient society, the spirit of sharing and co-creation must be complimented with another ideal. This ideal forms the essence of effective communication, namely, inclusive, ethical and dialogic communication. For such an ethical and dialogic communication practice to take hold, a conceptual definition of risk awareness seems highly suitable.
‘Risk awareness’ as a promising approach to assess the quality of responses to disinformation
As noted above, we are dealing here with complex definitions and scholarly concepts, which carry various perceptions and meanings influenced by different decision-makers. Among such concepts are definitions of structural response, societal resilience, public actions and many others, which have nevertheless found applications in policymaking and public discourse. Since decision-making and information-processing are socio-cultural processes that are sensitive to values and communication traditions relevant to a national context, as well as country’s geo-political location and memory politics, such variations across countries will also be evident in strategic thinking and policymaking.
In the broadest terms, risk awareness in relation to information disorders, such as disinformation and misinformation, is perceived as a horizontal strategy that encompasses a holistic approach with several dimensions. The dominant approach applied in different analyses leans towards relying on the examination of system-level characteristics (see, for example, Humprecht et al., 2020, 2021; …) as well as individual capacities (McDougal, Jolls, ….) that are required to minimize the detrimental effects of disinformation.
In our analysis, we focus and contend that a designated level of risk perception in a country is evidenced by strategic policymaking and the development of longer-term strategies to combat arising inequalities and digital information vulnerability.
Our initial argumentation rests on the idea that resilience of societies and groups can be improved if risk perception is understood and institutionalized in policymaking. To achieve such a practice, adequate situational awareness and risk perception is required at all social levels, including macro, mezzo, and micro levels.
If the structural and organizational capacities of the media environment of coping with risks have been thoroughly reviewed (see, for example, Humprecht et al., 2020, 2021), one dimension, defined here as a human-centered approach, has been overlooked. Specifically, finding adequate risk management solutions that consider people’s capacity for reaction has been insufficient.
By advocating for this approach, we endorse the idea that information-related risks and crises are not solely linked to physical phenomena, such as digitally accelerated communication and overabundance of (dis)information. Instead, these risks reflect connections to the evolution of people’s media awareness, which is influenced by information processing strategies, cultural and social traditions, and psychological factors (…).
Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the conceptualization of digital vulnerability to incorporate new aspects of both the digital media environment and individual reactions. Specifically, the understanding of individual information vulnerability should not be confined to those factors that are understood in the classical terms, such as socio-economic disparities like age, education, and income.
Information-exploitations and vulnerability
As a complex and multifaceted issue, disinformation and the risks it generates are so pervasive that no one can fully consider themselves entirely immune to its detrimental effects (DIGIRES, 2022). Likewise, it must be acknowledged that the specific concept of vulnerability, frequently explored in research of responses to disinformation, must be examined in combination with the concept of resilience. Its particular aspect, defined as “informational vulnerability”, refers to an individual state that emerges in response to information disruptions. It evolves over time, with different factors contributing to its final outcome, among which individual information capabilities (skills and media accessibility), assessments of self-efficacy are among the predominant ones (…; Bandura, 2006; …).
As mentioned previously, disinformation often exploits predominant societal divisions and conflicts. Confronted with conflicting narratives, individuals tend to respond by relying on their prejudices that confirm pre-existing beliefs and further deepen divisions. The erosion of trust takes place, leading to societal disintegration and exacerbates conflicts.
Improving the resilience of people and communities is intricately linked to understanding of vulnerability. Therefore, a number of questions call to be addressed in such a context, namely:
· Can resilience analyses be pursued without an understanding of vulnerabilities? How should these vulnerabilities be defined?
· Which indicators must be considered in analyzing resilience capacities, and how should collected data focusing on national resilience analyses be interpreted?
· How comparative analyses can inform national policies in terms of common practices and nationally specific characteristics?
In traditional terms, vulnerability refers to distinct material or cultural features of a social group that might make them susceptible to exploitation and inequality. Inequalities highlight the unequal distribution of digital advantages, resulting in different levels of access to resources that are made available and distributed via online communications means.
Conditions for vulnerability tend to be most severe in undemocratic societies and communities, where legal rights are limited, unevenly distributed, or where the rule of law is not respected. The identification of vulnerabilities is selective in all societies, yet it is unlikely that any polity could free themselves of vulnerabilities. Vulnerability is often connected to socially under-privileged groups: non-citizens, the disabled, the elderly, the poor etc.
Demographic characteristics like age, education, and social status may play a role in conditioning vulnerability or resilience to information disorders, including specific types like conspiracy theories, fake news, and rumors. It’s worth noting that some scholars argue that the strategies for dealing with information disorders, whether its misinformation stemming from ignorance, disinformation being planned, or other types, do not fundamentally differ (Golob et al., 2021).
As for the age dimension, the sources tend to have a consensus that older people are more vulnerable to information disorders, including disinformation (Boulianne et al., 2022; Claudia, 2022; Dudin et al., 2019; Golob et al., 2021; Miyamoto, 2021; Rodríguez-Pérez & Canel, 2023); yet it is recognized that young people have their own challenges, largely associated with the extensive use of digital technologies (Miyamoto, 2021; Monteiro et al., 2022).
Education has some positive effect (Dudin et al., 2019; Golob et al., 2021; Rodríguez-Pérez & Canel, 2023), though it is not always decisive (Boulianne et al., 2022; Claudia, 2022). A higher income, at the same time, is a factor that favors resilience (Dudin et al., 2019).
As for the gender question, there are very different findings among scholars. Boulianne et al. (2022) argue that “being female is rarely significant as a factor in predicting awareness of, exposure to, and sharing of misinformation”, while the article by Rodríguez-Pérez & Canel (2023) states that women have less resilience to disinformation, which, according to their own commentary, contradicts other studies (Golob et al., 2021; Humprecht et al., 2021). One of the potential explanations may be conveyed from Golob et al. (2021) study, where the authors elaborate that while having higher meta-reflexivity, women may have fewer opportunities to additionally check media content due to being more distracted in domestic spaces.
All things considered, information-based exploitations might take on different forms, such as promotions of conspiratorial thinking, which can result in the deprivation of certain quality information resources or fundamental rights among these vulnerable groups. In addition to communication rights, these rights include specific aspects, such as physical or mental health, legal status, access to services and recognition. All these loses of basic rights might be temporary or they may yield permanent marginalization and not to be repaired.
“Communicatively structured” inequalities and vulnerabilities might be directly exploited with manipulative attacks, specifically constructed false narratives, and disinformation, leading to detrimental outcomes, such as manipulations in political opinion formation during elections, a decrease in trust in intuitions and fellow citizens, and more.
As vividly described by Andrew Chadwick (2014) regarding digital power reconfigurations, within transmedial communication landscapes, authority rests in the hands of those who shape, manipulate and direct information flows to align with their objectives. This influence extends to modifying, facilitating, and impeding the power dynamics of individuals, particularly lacking attention or information proficiency.
In summary, in the realm of a digital communication environment, society, it’s individuals and groups may experience vulnerability stemming from their restricted control of (a) overarching structural conditions (macro level), (b) digital media representations and portrayals (mezzo level), and (c) communication rights and digital capacities at the micro level.
Discussion and conclusion
There is no single answer to what makes some societies more resilient than others and which strategies in countering disinformation work best in which geographic and cultural context.
Building resilience to disinformation by promoting institutional transparency and accountability and strengthening political and media literacy capacities of people are important steps in mitigating the impact of disinformation on societal trust. Democracies with lower degrees of institutional and interpersonal trust appear especially vulnerable in the situations of heightened uncertainty and are prone to populist manipulations (…). Also, even in more mature democracies, with high levels of institutional trust, press freedom, and media literacy, online disinformation poses challenges to national security and societal coherence.
Public perceptions and responses to risk are subjective. Therefore, it is crucial to adopt a multidisciplinary research approach to individual and group response analysis to implications of manipulative content and dysfunctional communication. By examining the socio-economic factors behind related vulnerabilities, one can find solutions for information-linked inequalities, such as distrust in institutions or the growing support for political populism. On one hand, adequate responses in the forms of inclusive communication and promoting communication rights must be put forward. In addition, these responses should be empowered with strategies of ethical communication.
It becomes evident that, beyond strategic policy thinking and risk awareness, a comprehensive framework of engaging interventions by different public and private actors needs to be pursued.
This framework aims to establish new networks and reinforce existing levels of collaboration and networking between state and business organizations, media, creative industries, civil society groups and the general public, all working to safeguard the right to reliable information. Hence, a significant issue in this context is tied to inclusiveness and stakeholder cooperation. Simultaneously, it is understood that the establishment of a culture of dialogic communication presents a challenge that numerous stakeholders are only now beginning to recognize.
All in all, democratic capacities of the public must evolve to align with the complexities of online communication environments and changing news ecosystems. This implies that, in addition to promoting critical thinking (which is a common theme in all media literacy policies), there is a need to raise and foster awareness of “effective communication” practices along with a practical culture of engaging in dialogic communication.
The current crises in all societies are caused by complex and multiple factors, such as the enduring climate changes and environmental threats, followed by economic challenges and global migration, health risks and the pandemic, Russian aggression and war in Ukraine and related geopolitical challenges to security in Europe. Additionally, there is a growing feeling of a rapidly approaching revolutionary epistemic shift that arises from accelerated digitalization and technological AI innovations. It is necessary to turn digital (media and information) literacy, as well as critical thinking and related digital engagement acts, into competences of “meta power”, hence meta-literacy – so that knowledge and practical doings become a sustainable, democratic resilience-oriented, and mutually empowering force that provides a decisive response to manipulations and attacks on human rights and democracy. A force that grows “from below” – from actions of citizens’ of all age groups, expertise, professions, and social standings. A force for which space for development is created by structures and institutions “from above” – those of government, IT, media, education, and cultural services.
Results and Studies
Disinformation trends in the Baltics: war in Ukraine, NATO presence and controversy over edible insects
During the second quarter of the year the fact-checking efforts in the three Baltic states primarily concentrated on the war in Ukraine and the spread of Russian propaganda about it. The highest level of Ukraine-related disinformation was found in Lithuania, while Latvia and Estonia saw a decline.
Non-war related conspiracies and fabricated stories about the health featured heavily in the all three Baltic states. For example, false claims emerged in Latvia and Lithuania that massive earthquakes in Syria and Turkey were deliberately induced by a US-controlled “climate weapon,” aiming to tarnish the reputation of US officials, local authorities, the United Nations, NATO and EU.
Kremlin’s propaganda in our pockets. How disinformation thrives on Telegram.
By banning Kremlin’s TV and online propaganda in the Baltics, the access to such resources has become more challenging only for those whose primary source used to be television. Now social media platforms have taken up that space, among which Telegram stands out because it does not share data with governments and does not moderate disinformation and lies.
In the Baltics, the most popular channels directed towards local Russian speakers are not having the big following in numbers, but that is not the point: their main role is to amplify each other’s content and create the impression that many people think alike. Telegram played a particularly significant role during the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Various activists, both well-known and new, have joined forces on “Telegram” to popularise pro-Kremlin messages.
A Trend Report on Russia’s Disinformation Tactics Targeting the Baltics
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February last year has brought about a change in Russia’s long-standing efforts to influence Latvian and Baltic information spaces with disinformation.
The escalation of the war and the resulting widespread backlash against the Russian regime has reinforced the Kremlin’s need to break the current relationship in order to return to the relative normality that existed before 24 February.
At the same time, it would be wrong to claim that Russian disinformation has been fundamentally transformed in terms of messages against the background of the war, since Russia’s own foreign policy orientations have not been transformed.
But the war has provided new pretexts to try to deliver messages that have been tried and tested for years to audiences, in an attempt to adapt them to the current situation.
Is TikTok a Gateway to Politics in the Baltics? For Now, Only in Latvia
Although there is a common assumption that TikTok is used only by a younger generation, Re:Baltica’s analysis shows that in Latvia it’s a powerful tool enough for populists to get into parliament.
After shutting down Kremlin’s TV channels, TikTok has become fertile soil also for Kremlin’s narratives. Latvian State Security service has started seven criminal investigations for supporting Moscow on TikTok, while Lithuania and Estonia are taking a lighter approach.
Why so, read in Re:Baltica’s Baltic disinformation quarterly review about the use of TikTok.
Report on current issues, methodologies and needs in anti-disinformation actions
DIGIRES report provides an up-to-date analysis of actions to combat disinformation aimed at promoting the digital resilience of Lithuanian society, and proposes the idea of multisectoral integration and multistakeholder partnership.
Report by: Baltic Research Foundation for Digital Resilience
Aukse Balcytiene, Darius Amilevicius, Kristina Berksun, Dmytro larovyi, leva lvanauskaite, Kristina
Juraite, Neringa Jurciukonyte, lgnas Kalpokas, Violeta KaraliOnaite, Rimgaile Kasparaite, Dominyka
Lapelyte, Epp Lauk, Patricija Lenciauskiene, Aiste Meidute, Hannu Nieminen, Ramune Ramanauskiene,
Darius Remeika, JO rate Ruzaite, Brigita Sabaliauskaite, Aiste TurcinaviciOte, Andrius Utka.
Whether their goal is to amass a following, oppose environmentally friendly policies, or resist what they perceive as “totalitarian global control”, a diverse group of disinformation spreaders has shifted its focus to the topic of climate change. This report provides an overview of how climate misinformation is disseminated in the Baltic States, shedding light on the tactics and actors involved in spreading false or misleading information on the topic of climate change.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th last year has altered its longstanding efforts to influence the information landscape of Latvia and the Baltic States through disinformation campaigns. This report highlights the central themes in these campaigns, ranging from accusations of widespread Russophobia to portrayals of Western countries as intellectual concentration camps. These narratives serve the Kremlin’s objectives of influencing public opinion and advancing its interests in the region.
In the wake of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have intensified their efforts to influence narratives in the Baltic States, particularly Latvia. These campaigns exploit a variety of themes to cast Russia as the victim and portray Latvia’s actions as hostile. A recurring theme is Latvia’s alleged subservience to Western countries and their policies, as well as its perceived role in fueling Russophobia and nationalism. This report delves into these narratives, highlighting their core elements and objectives while providing a comprehensive overview of the disinformation tactics employed.
Auksė Balčytienė, Dmytro Iarovyi
Introduction
Disinformation vulnerability is defined as the extent to which individuals, groups of people and communities are susceptible to the implications of digital disinformation. Addressing manipulative situations is significantly influenced by contextual and technological aspects of information provision. These also include the defining characteristics of representations within the media, as well as individual psychological factors, such as cognitive biases and digital skills as well as news consumption habits.
Contested concepts: Resilience and vulnerability
Despite the numerous scholarly attempts to clarify the fuzziness of the concept of disinformation, also the variety of responses to combat it – ranging from structural and legal protection systems on a governmetal level to fact-checking and media literacy efforts by various organizations – there are still quite a few unanswerred questions. The most important ones pertain to the necessary shift from responsive and reactionary to more active risk awareness raising via strategic policymaking moves as well as practical educational interventions. As expected, these moves would foster the democratic epistemic capacities of the public and enhance the resilience to digital information disruptions. In addition to these practices, another issue of hightened significance emerges in the context of complexity in contemporray communications, namelly the strategic everyday efforts required to rebuilding of trust, both in institutions and among fellow citizens.
Responding to such needs, media literacy, fact-checking and platform governance initiatives are advocated by European institutions and collaborative initiatives, such as European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), as well as national and regional Hubs, as the necessary means to the developement of epistemic resilience and sustainable risk awareness among all stakeholders. These efforts hold significant importance in terms of mobilization and sharing of the expertise in governance actions, fact-checking, research innovations and media education on transnational, regional and local levels.
To begin with, online disinformation calls to be defined as a “wicked problem”. Wicked problems refer to a myriad of socio-cultural contexts; they are characterized by high complexity and lack clear definitions. Online disinformation is recognized by its deceptive nature that is inherently marked by significant ambiguity.
Drafting policies to address wicked problems requires a holistic understanding of the entire context, which in the case of online disinformation, is determined by the specificities of the national information ecosystem on one hand and a wide range of stakeholders seeking different solutions on the other. Similarly, examination of disinformation invites a great variety of approaches for analysis, including those encompassing digital technological and socio-political outcomes. So, addressing online disinformation as a wicked problem cannot yield a single definitive approach leading to successful solution.
When dealing with disinformation, in most cases, the focus is on fostering societal resilience as a desirable outcome, around which all solutions aimed at the mitigating of disinformation should revolve. On the other hand, societal resilience itself is an ambiguous social state that lacks a clear-cut definition. Hence, an understanding evolves that all societal reactions to online disinformation, along with susceptibility to manipulations and related vulnerabilities, should be seen and addressed as “symptoms” of some deeper societal conflicts, inequalities, unresolved issues, and responses to change and transformations (Bennett & Livingston, 2020; Kreiss, 2021). Upon further examination it becomes evident that these issues and social narratives are intricately intertwined with the cultural and contextual aspects unique to each country. Their formation is influenced by enduring and unresolved societal conflicts revolving around developmental histories, upheavals, losses, and cultural traditions specific to each geographic and socio-psychological context. As scholars (Juurvee & Arold, 2021; Kapantai et al., 2021; Lewandowsky & Van Der Linden, 2021) argue that the spread of hatred, uncertainty, fear, hate (including hate crimes against minorities, such as immigrants), and vandalism, or supremacism, Islamophobia, racism, or misogyny (Vériter et al., 2020) are largely associated with disinformation spread. Being reinforced through the effect of echo-chambers, the already established radical beliefs are becoming even more dangerous (Bjola & Papadakis, 2021; Di Mascio et al., 2021).
The analysis of disinformation vulnerability comprises a wide range of adverse effects of disinformation on democratic institutions, national security, public health, economic stability, technological issues, and more. The threats to democracy are discussed as the risks of election manipulation by internal and external malignant actors (Kapantai et al., 2021; Lee, 2018; Shackelford et al., 2020; Vériter et al., 2020), the rise of populist movements whose claims are reinforced in such an environment (Di Mascio et al., 2021; Tripodi et al., 2023), the utilization of COVID-related disinformation to enforce attacks on the democratic institutions of the EU or the US (Jerónimo & Esparza, 2022).
One of the frequently observed detrimental effects of disinformation is the attacks against the legitimacy of social and political institutions, leading to a trust crisis and willingness of people to believe in facts (Claudia, 2022; Di Mascio et al., 2021; Lewandowsky & Van Der Linden, 2021; Rodríguez-Pérez & Canel, 2023). In line with assaults on democratic institutions is the national security challenge posed by disinformation. The implications on security are closely related to the challenges in democracy, partly due to the fact that polarization (and radicalization as its consequence) poses security challenges. This cybersecurity component is closely related to effects on democracy aspects mentioned earlier, as the spread of disinformation utilizing technical means further exacerbates the challenges for democracy, for example, through opinion shaping in elections which amplifies polarization (Manwaring & Holloway, 2023).
Furthermore, democracies are specifically vulnerable to such attacks due to narrower opportunities to legitimately deal with disinformation (Shadmy, 2022). As shown in a comprehensive overview done by Bjola & Papadakis (2021) on the case of Finland, disinformation harms the epistemological basis for truth-claim validation, which causes intensification of emotional discussions, empowers destructive counterpublics, and reinforces the challenges towards multiculturalism and diversity.
With this perspective in mind, we contend that national country responses to the influx of disinformation should be examined not only through structural measures such also as policy initiatives and governance decisions made. Instead, developing strategies to combatting disinformation should be treated as socio-political and socio-cultural process that involves multiple stakeholders and requires their awareness and engagement.
For all those efforts to be successful and reach the aim of building a resilient society, the spirit of sharing and co-creation must be complimented with another ideal. This ideal forms the essence of effective communication, namely, inclusive, ethical and dialogic communication. For such an ethical and dialogic communication practice to take hold, a conceptual definition of risk awareness seems highly suitable.
‘Risk awareness’ as a promising approach to assess the quality of responses to disinformation
As noted above, we are dealing here with complex definitions and scholarly concepts, which carry various perceptions and meanings influenced by different decision-makers. Among such concepts are definitions of structural response, societal resilience, public actions and many others, which have nevertheless found applications in policymaking and public discourse. Since decision-making and information-processing are socio-cultural processes that are sensitive to values and communication traditions relevant to a national context, as well as country’s geo-political location and memory politics, such variations across countries will also be evident in strategic thinking and policymaking.
In the broadest terms, risk awareness in relation to information disorders, such as disinformation and misinformation, is perceived as a horizontal strategy that encompasses a holistic approach with several dimensions. The dominant approach applied in different analyses leans towards relying on the examination of system-level characteristics (see, for example, Humprecht et al., 2020, 2021; …) as well as individual capacities (McDougal, Jolls, ….) that are required to minimize the detrimental effects of disinformation.
In our analysis, we focus and contend that a designated level of risk perception in a country is evidenced by strategic policymaking and the development of longer-term strategies to combat arising inequalities and digital information vulnerability.
Our initial argumentation rests on the idea that resilience of societies and groups can be improved if risk perception is understood and institutionalized in policymaking. To achieve such a practice, adequate situational awareness and risk perception is required at all social levels, including macro, mezzo, and micro levels.
If the structural and organizational capacities of the media environment of coping with risks have been thoroughly reviewed (see, for example, Humprecht et al., 2020, 2021), one dimension, defined here as a human-centered approach, has been overlooked. Specifically, finding adequate risk management solutions that consider people’s capacity for reaction has been insufficient.
By advocating for this approach, we endorse the idea that information-related risks and crises are not solely linked to physical phenomena, such as digitally accelerated communication and overabundance of (dis)information. Instead, these risks reflect connections to the evolution of people’s media awareness, which is influenced by information processing strategies, cultural and social traditions, and psychological factors (…).
Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the conceptualization of digital vulnerability to incorporate new aspects of both the digital media environment and individual reactions. Specifically, the understanding of individual information vulnerability should not be confined to those factors that are understood in the classical terms, such as socio-economic disparities like age, education, and income.
Information-exploitations and vulnerability
As a complex and multifaceted issue, disinformation and the risks it generates are so pervasive that no one can fully consider themselves entirely immune to its detrimental effects (DIGIRES, 2022). Likewise, it must be acknowledged that the specific concept of vulnerability, frequently explored in research of responses to disinformation, must be examined in combination with the concept of resilience. Its particular aspect, defined as “informational vulnerability”, refers to an individual state that emerges in response to information disruptions. It evolves over time, with different factors contributing to its final outcome, among which individual information capabilities (skills and media accessibility), assessments of self-efficacy are among the predominant ones (…; Bandura, 2006; …).
As mentioned previously, disinformation often exploits predominant societal divisions and conflicts. Confronted with conflicting narratives, individuals tend to respond by relying on their prejudices that confirm pre-existing beliefs and further deepen divisions. The erosion of trust takes place, leading to societal disintegration and exacerbates conflicts.
Improving the resilience of people and communities is intricately linked to understanding of vulnerability. Therefore, a number of questions call to be addressed in such a context, namely:
· Can resilience analyses be pursued without an understanding of vulnerabilities? How should these vulnerabilities be defined?
· Which indicators must be considered in analyzing resilience capacities, and how should collected data focusing on national resilience analyses be interpreted?
· How comparative analyses can inform national policies in terms of common practices and nationally specific characteristics?
In traditional terms, vulnerability refers to distinct material or cultural features of a social group that might make them susceptible to exploitation and inequality. Inequalities highlight the unequal distribution of digital advantages, resulting in different levels of access to resources that are made available and distributed via online communications means.
Conditions for vulnerability tend to be most severe in undemocratic societies and communities, where legal rights are limited, unevenly distributed, or where the rule of law is not respected. The identification of vulnerabilities is selective in all societies, yet it is unlikely that any polity could free themselves of vulnerabilities. Vulnerability is often connected to socially under-privileged groups: non-citizens, the disabled, the elderly, the poor etc.
Demographic characteristics like age, education, and social status may play a role in conditioning vulnerability or resilience to information disorders, including specific types like conspiracy theories, fake news, and rumors. It’s worth noting that some scholars argue that the strategies for dealing with information disorders, whether its misinformation stemming from ignorance, disinformation being planned, or other types, do not fundamentally differ (Golob et al., 2021).
As for the age dimension, the sources tend to have a consensus that older people are more vulnerable to information disorders, including disinformation (Boulianne et al., 2022; Claudia, 2022; Dudin et al., 2019; Golob et al., 2021; Miyamoto, 2021; Rodríguez-Pérez & Canel, 2023); yet it is recognized that young people have their own challenges, largely associated with the extensive use of digital technologies (Miyamoto, 2021; Monteiro et al., 2022).
Education has some positive effect (Dudin et al., 2019; Golob et al., 2021; Rodríguez-Pérez & Canel, 2023), though it is not always decisive (Boulianne et al., 2022; Claudia, 2022). A higher income, at the same time, is a factor that favors resilience (Dudin et al., 2019).
As for the gender question, there are very different findings among scholars. Boulianne et al. (2022) argue that “being female is rarely significant as a factor in predicting awareness of, exposure to, and sharing of misinformation”, while the article by Rodríguez-Pérez & Canel (2023) states that women have less resilience to disinformation, which, according to their own commentary, contradicts other studies (Golob et al., 2021; Humprecht et al., 2021). One of the potential explanations may be conveyed from Golob et al. (2021) study, where the authors elaborate that while having higher meta-reflexivity, women may have fewer opportunities to additionally check media content due to being more distracted in domestic spaces.
All things considered, information-based exploitations might take on different forms, such as promotions of conspiratorial thinking, which can result in the deprivation of certain quality information resources or fundamental rights among these vulnerable groups. In addition to communication rights, these rights include specific aspects, such as physical or mental health, legal status, access to services and recognition. All these loses of basic rights might be temporary or they may yield permanent marginalization and not to be repaired.
“Communicatively structured” inequalities and vulnerabilities might be directly exploited with manipulative attacks, specifically constructed false narratives, and disinformation, leading to detrimental outcomes, such as manipulations in political opinion formation during elections, a decrease in trust in intuitions and fellow citizens, and more.
As vividly described by Andrew Chadwick (2014) regarding digital power reconfigurations, within transmedial communication landscapes, authority rests in the hands of those who shape, manipulate and direct information flows to align with their objectives. This influence extends to modifying, facilitating, and impeding the power dynamics of individuals, particularly lacking attention or information proficiency.
In summary, in the realm of a digital communication environment, society, it’s individuals and groups may experience vulnerability stemming from their restricted control of (a) overarching structural conditions (macro level), (b) digital media representations and portrayals (mezzo level), and (c) communication rights and digital capacities at the micro level.
Discussion and conclusion
There is no single answer to what makes some societies more resilient than others and which strategies in countering disinformation work best in which geographic and cultural context.
Building resilience to disinformation by promoting institutional transparency and accountability and strengthening political and media literacy capacities of people are important steps in mitigating the impact of disinformation on societal trust. Democracies with lower degrees of institutional and interpersonal trust appear especially vulnerable in the situations of heightened uncertainty and are prone to populist manipulations (…). Also, even in more mature democracies, with high levels of institutional trust, press freedom, and media literacy, online disinformation poses challenges to national security and societal coherence.
Public perceptions and responses to risk are subjective. Therefore, it is crucial to adopt a multidisciplinary research approach to individual and group response analysis to implications of manipulative content and dysfunctional communication. By examining the socio-economic factors behind related vulnerabilities, one can find solutions for information-linked inequalities, such as distrust in institutions or the growing support for political populism. On one hand, adequate responses in the forms of inclusive communication and promoting communication rights must be put forward. In addition, these responses should be empowered with strategies of ethical communication.
It becomes evident that, beyond strategic policy thinking and risk awareness, a comprehensive framework of engaging interventions by different public and private actors needs to be pursued.
This framework aims to establish new networks and reinforce existing levels of collaboration and networking between state and business organizations, media, creative industries, civil society groups and the general public, all working to safeguard the right to reliable information. Hence, a significant issue in this context is tied to inclusiveness and stakeholder cooperation. Simultaneously, it is understood that the establishment of a culture of dialogic communication presents a challenge that numerous stakeholders are only now beginning to recognize.
All in all, democratic capacities of the public must evolve to align with the complexities of online communication environments and changing news ecosystems. This implies that, in addition to promoting critical thinking (which is a common theme in all media literacy policies), there is a need to raise and foster awareness of “effective communication” practices along with a practical culture of engaging in dialogic communication.
The current crises in all societies are caused by complex and multiple factors, such as the enduring climate changes and environmental threats, followed by economic challenges and global migration, health risks and the pandemic, Russian aggression and war in Ukraine and related geopolitical challenges to security in Europe. Additionally, there is a growing feeling of a rapidly approaching revolutionary epistemic shift that arises from accelerated digitalization and technological AI innovations. It is necessary to turn digital (media and information) literacy, as well as critical thinking and related digital engagement acts, into competences of “meta power”, hence meta-literacy – so that knowledge and practical doings become a sustainable, democratic resilience-oriented, and mutually empowering force that provides a decisive response to manipulations and attacks on human rights and democracy. A force that grows “from below” – from actions of citizens’ of all age groups, expertise, professions, and social standings. A force for which space for development is created by structures and institutions “from above” – those of government, IT, media, education, and cultural services.
