{"id":7476,"date":"2024-02-05T17:22:16","date_gmt":"2024-02-05T15:22:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/becid.eu\/?post_type=results_and_studies&p=7476"},"modified":"2024-02-08T10:53:19","modified_gmt":"2024-02-08T08:53:19","slug":"a-trend-report-on-russias-disinformation-tactics-targeting-the-baltics","status":"publish","type":"results_and_studies","link":"https:\/\/becid.eu\/ru\/results_and_studies\/a-trend-report-on-russias-disinformation-tactics-targeting-the-baltics\/","title":{"rendered":"A Trend Report on Russia\u2019s Disinformation Tactics Targeting the Baltics"},"content":{"rendered":"

A Trend Report on Russia\u2019s Disinformation Tactics Targeting the Baltics<\/p>\n

\n\n\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February last year has brought about a change in Russia\u2019s long-standing efforts to influence Latvian and Baltic information spaces with disinformation.<\/p>

\n\n\n\nThe escalation of the war and the resulting widespread backlash against the Russian regime has reinforced the Kremlin\u2019s need to break the current relationship in order to return to the relative normality that existed before 24 February.<\/p>

\n\n\n\nAt the same time, it would be wrong to claim that Russian disinformation has been fundamentally transformed in terms of messages against the background of the war, since Russia\u2019s own foreign policy orientations have not been transformed.<\/p>

\n\n\n\nBut the war has provided new pretexts to try to deliver messages that have been tried and tested for years to audiences, in an attempt to adapt them to the current situation.<\/p>

\n\n\n\n<\/p>